Cuba-Canada Relations: A Model To Be Copied

By Manuel E. Yepe

Although it may not have been the purpose of the authors of a recently published book on Cuba-Canadian relations, it is a good example of what could have been and still can be ties between the United States and Cuba.
The book by Canadian professors John M. Kirk and Peter McKenna, “Seventy Years of Cuba-Canadian bilateral relations published by the Cuban publishing house, Editorial Ciencias Sociales, does not deal with this history as a panacea. It tells of happy moments with the same objectivity as when treating issues of tension and troubles.
Despite the fact that Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was very much an anti-communist, an ardent monarchist, and supported the British Commonwealth and NATO, comments by the Canadian ambassador in Washington, Charles Ritchie, in the days of the triumph of the Revolution when, already, the United States government was involved in actions to overthrow the new government, is defined by the authors as a summary of Ottawa's position at the time:
“We believe that what occurred in Cuba is a popular social revolution and is not a government inspired by Communist Russia … if something similar happened in Canada,… shouldn’t we consider it as only our business and would we not be offended by any interference? (…) we have always been against policies of economic strangulation.
Kirk and McKenna emphasized that the transcendence of the position taken by Diefenbaker should not be underestimated, considering the pressures applied by Washington on Mexico and Canada which were the only nations not breaking relations with Cuba during the early 1960s.
The book explains the strong pressures applied on Canada for its failure to officially support the position of the United States against Cuba. Its ambassador was repeatedly called by the State Department to express displeasure for that reason.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., advisor to President Kennedy, repeatedly asked the Canadian ambassador “with unrestrained sarcasm” if Ottawa had decided to place Castro on a par with Kennedy”.
All this, without forgetting that the Canadian government had clearly told the Cuban government that it was a firm ally of the United States, in spite of basic differences of opinion on the most appropriate manner to deal with the Cuban government.
When Lester Pearson, a close friend of Kennedy, occupied the Canadian government, there were dark signs over the future of Cuba-Canadian relations that had touched bottom shortly before the Missile Crisis in October of 1962.
But the book explains that what followed was merely a Canadian policy of inertia, and a decision to maintain the status quo in relations “afar”, but with no intention of overthrowing the revolutionary government of Cuba. What followed was “a pointed cooling off” policy which included disagreements with basic issues of US policy. According to the authors, Cuban diplomacy found that difficult to understand.
Then came the government of Pierre Trudeau in 1962, losing in 1972 and recovering power in 1974, only to lose it again in 1979 and again retaking it in 1980.
With Trudeau came a break in the stagnation of Cuban-Canadian relations and these reached their highest point in 1976 with his visit to the island. A unique personal friendship was established between the two “regardless of ideological and political differences”.
The book also analyses bilateral relations during the Brian Mulroney government, which was characterized by apathy and lack of care, not necessarily miserly but deliberate.
The authors describe the diplomatic and trade ties a “honeymoon” during the early part of the Chretien government whose policy of “constructive commitment” and “principled pragmatism” ended with a cooling-off because of the very different interpretations concerning the essence of human rights and historical reality of the two countries.
The book ends its analysis with the initial period of the Paul Martin government, which, by its conservative nature and obsession with improving ties with Washington, no one expected to act towards a strengthening of ties with Havana. Nevertheless, events demonstrate a traditional policy of reciprocal respect and mutual convenience.
Since it has nothing to do with a policy of collaboration with Cuba, acknowledging the difficult moments during a half-century by which a small and poor nation of the third world, has had to overcome enormous sacrifices, ravaged by the only economic, technological and military superpower which, to cap it off, is also for Canada, the closest neighbour.
Canada’s policy towards Cuba has been pragmatic and based on the reality of the country, expecting it to be similar in practice to Japan, Mexico and Chile, Kirk and McKenna believe.
It is not a “special” relationship but, at times, it seems so, simply because of the abnormal and strange one, which the United States maintains toward the island. As the authors affirm, the policy of Ottawa towards Cuba is no different than the one Canada has with many other countries – an issue that the strategy applied by Washington is counterproductive and mistaken.
Certainly, the mentality of “pending issues” related to the task of overthrowing the Cuban revolution during ten successive administrations is in contrast with the service towards world peace and the very interests of their nation regarding relations with Cuba during half a century of Canadian governments. It is a model to be copied!
Note: Manuel E. Yepe is a lawyer, economist and professor of the International Relations Institute of Havana. The article was translated by Ana Portela and edited by Walter Lippmann.